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23 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR, TRAINING (SPECIAL)

(ROUTED VIA CHIEF, ATD)

SUBJECT: Request for Informal Forum Discussion of
Current Investigative Techniques Training Problems

REFERENCES:

- a. Memo to DD/TR(S) dtd 27 June 1952; Subject:
Recommended Revision of TRS Investigative
Techniques Instruction.
- b. Memo to DD/TR(S) dtd 6 Oct 1952; Subject:
Investigative Techniques Training.
- c. Memo to DD/TR(S) dtd 14 Nov 1952; Subject:
Proposed TRS/TSS Investigative Techniques
Research Project.
- d. Memo to Chief, ATD/TR(S) dtd 6 Jan 1953;
Subject: Orientation Paper re Operational
Use of Investigative Techniques.

1. The writer wishes to repeat at this time the suggestion which he made in reference "c," for the initiation by TR(S) of an informal forum discussion of the current investigative techniques training problems, to include a number of Agency officials with previous experience in investigative activities as well as in the field of clandestine operations.

2. There does not appear to be any major difference of opinion as to what needs to be accomplished: the inclusion in the common courses of instruction of a realistic defensive familiarization with the modus operandi of security services, with emphasis on their employment of investigative techniques; advanced training for selected operations personnel in the utilization of investigative techniques in clandestine operations, with prerequisite technical training; and, intensive advanced training for specialists. The FI Training Officer has estimated a continuing student load of twenty or more students for the Phase "A" and Phase "B" courses currently under consideration. Personnel responsible for the inspection and review of current operations on the DD/P staff informed the writer that their findings reflect a significant unawareness on behalf of staff officers of the

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NO CHANGE in Class. ☐

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Class. CHANGED TO TS S C

DDA Memo, 4 Apr 77

Date: 03 Nov 77 By: 224

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investigative capabilities of security services as one of the major factors responsible for current security flaps. They also expressed informal approval of the currently proposed training programs.

3. The writer repeats this request because of the major differences of opinion prevalent concerning how this training program should be developed. He feels that this program is essential to the overall training program but that the current TR(S) commitments regarding same, as outlined to him, are entirely inadequate. He wishes to reiterate his statements made in reference "c.", and to request that TR(S) accept the counsel of personnel experienced in this field before proceeding with this program. Specifically, the writer draws the following conclusions, which he finds strongly supported by qualified sources.

a. The development of advanced training in the utilization of investigative techniques in clandestine operations is not an operationally sound venture without the prior development of basic competence in the employment of these techniques. The basic investigative fields included here are: surveillance, investigation and interrogation (supported with technical aids).

b. The development of advanced training in the utilization of investigative techniques in clandestine operations requires the efforts of specialized personnel with actual experience in the investigative employment of these techniques, supported by both operational and technical guidance. The personnel currently available for this program have excellent basic knowledge of some of the techniques involved. However, the current program, as outlined to the writer, would not afford them opportunity to gain the minimum necessary experience in the investigative application of these techniques prior to the attempted development of advanced training.

c. This training program, in its current status, is not attractive to qualified ~~personnel~~ *instructors*.

d. The writer feels that the pursuit of the current program, as outlined to him, is analogous to the development and presentation of a ski jumping course by personnel who have considerable knowledge of skis but who have never actually accomplished the ability to ski. The investigative skills required for the development of this program can be developed only through actual experience.

4. As early as 27 June 1952, in reference "a.", the writer requested the procurement of qualified personnel to contribute to the development of this program. This request has been repeated on numerous occasions, but to date no such personnel have been obtained.

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As has been stated previously, the writer realizes the incompatibility of his opinions on this subject with those of his TR(S) superiors, and he has reported his opinion that none on the TR(S) staff (including himself) is professionally qualified to pass final judgment on this matter without the aid of professional advice from those actually experienced in the investigative field. It is hoped that these statements and this request will be accepted strictly from a professional viewpoint, without personal feelings involved.

5. The writer would like to nominate the individuals listed below, and any other personnel of similar qualifications, for consideration in connection with this request.


a. From the Office of Training (Special):

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b. From the clandestine services:

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6. In the event that the TR(S) staff declines to accept counsel in this matter from such qualified sources as listed above, the writer feels that any continued efforts on his behalf in connection with this program would be useless. In such event he would appreciate release from the Office of Training for reassignment with the clandestine services. He has been assigned to TR(S) for twenty-six months on what was originally agreed to be a twenty-four month tour of duty.

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